Many production firms use intermediary trading firms to export indirectly. This paper investigates the tax evasion motive through indirect trade, using Chinese export data at transaction level. We provide strong evidence that, under the partial export VAT rebate policy of China, production firms can effectively evade value-added taxes (VAT) by under-reporting their selling prices to domestic intermediary trading firms, especially when they sell differentiated products. The benefit of such an evasion can be as high as 17% of the under-reported value. This tax evasion motive is estimated to have an economically comparable and often larger effect on trade intermediation compared to factors examined in other studies for Chinese exporters. Even for a moderate level of under-reporting, the revenue loss is close to one billion U.S. dollars. We also find that such under-reporting behavior through domestic intermediaries may be associated with cross-border evasion through under-reporting export values to foreign partners. In addition, our result indicates that the evasion motive is stronger for larger transactions.
Introduction
Production firms can export directly by themselves or rely on intermediary trading firms to export for them (indirect exports).
1 Intermediary trading firms play an important role in international trade. In the U.S., wholesale and retail firms account for about 11 percent and 24 percent of exports and imports respectively (Bernard et al., 2010) . In the early 1980s, three hundred Japanese trading firms (sogo shosha) handled 80 percent of Japanese trade (Rossman 1984) . According to the data from China Customs, indirect exports in China accounted for 38 percent of the shipments and 21 percent of the value in the year of 2005. Despite the extensive studies at firm level in the recent trade literature, the role of trading firms has not been fully explored. This paper investigates the tax evasion motive behind indirect exports in China, stemming from the partial export value-added tax (VAT) rebate policy.
In countries that adopt a destination-based VAT, including China, the VAT should be collected on domestic transactions, but not on exports. The VAT on the value added at the final stage before exporting should be exempted, and the previously paid input VAT should be fully refunded in principle so that exporters can regain their initial competitiveness. Unlike the full rebate policy in the EU and elsewhere, China has a partial rebate system with rebate rates less than or at most equal to collection rates. The unrebated part of the VAT becomes effectively an export tax, 2 which is calculated based on the export prices for direct exporters (production firms) but domestic purchasing prices for indirect exporters (trading firms).
To evade such an export tax, exporters have an incentive to under-report either their export prices or domestic purchasing prices. 3 Direct exporters (production firms) may directly evade the effective VAT by under-reporting its FOB price as long as they can find foreign partners to collude in order to recover the loss due to under-reporting. Indirect exporters (trading firms) may have an incentive to under-report their domestic purchasing price to evade VAT; they also have an incentive to under-report export prices to minimize purchasing-selling price differentials, which is used by the government to detect tax evasion.
Although foreign partners are also needed to recover the under-reported values, trading firms are more skilled to do so because they are normally larger, more politically connected, and more familiar with foreign markets than production firms. As a result, it is relatively easier for trading companies to under-report prices than production firms. This paper explores how firms evade such an export tax through indirect exports.
The above discussion suggests a positive correlation between export tax rates (i.e., the nonrefundable part of VAT) and probability of indirect exporting, which is measured by the share of indirect exports in our product level analysis. That is, the higher the implicit export tax, the more likely it is that exporting will be done through an intermediary. We test this hypothesis using China Customs export data at the transaction level for the year 2005, which is the first year after the full liberalization of trading rights under China's WTO commitments. 4 This correlation is empirically robust, especially for differentiated products whose values are easier to under-report than homogenous products, and is also stronger for the exports of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which are more politically connected with the government than private or foreign firms.
As mentioned above, although the VAT rebate to a trading firm is not based on its final export price, it may also have an incentive to under-report exporting prices to minimize the chance of being caught. This is because the purchasing and selling price differential is used by Chinese tax authorities to detect evasion behaviors. Such a view is supported by a product-country level analysis. This implies that the tax evasion through domestic trading firms may be associated with cross border evasion in the case of indirect exports. Therefore, both types of evasion should be reflected in the under-reported export values and the data reporting discrepancies between China and importing countries. The current paper provides a complete explanation for the export price under-reporting by both direct and indirect exporters, which in turn helps to explain why China reported exports are significantly smaller than the corresponding imports reported by partner countries such as the U.S. The fast-growing trade of China, especially its exports and large trade surplus, has drawn increasing attention. Investigating the incentives behind the under-reporting of China's exports not only provide policy makers a clearer picture of China's trade but also help authorities to detect and curb evasion behaviors.
Although the scope of VAT evasion is usually considered to be small because this tax 4 We choose to use the data for year 2005 for the following reasons. First, before 2005, the export and import right was under the examination and approval system. Production firms would have to choose indirect exports if they did not have export right, which is unrelated to tax evasion. Second, two other related papers on Chinese intermediary firms, Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei (2011) and Tang and Zhang (2012) , also use the data of 2005.
To facilitate the comparison with their work, we follow them by choosing the same year.
is imposed at every stage of production and it is difficult for all of the involved firms to collude, our results suggest that the partial rebate policy can motivate firms to evade VAT.
We show how firms respond to tax incentives by choosing to export either directly or indirectly through intermediaries. Anecdotal evidence shows that some production firms export indirectly through trading companies or establish seemingly separate but actually related trading companies simply to facilitate tax evasion. Such kinds of related transactions are usually difficult to observe and to identify. The methodology in this paper provides evidence that is consistent with such kinds of evasion behaviors. In fact, there are explicit provisions in China for production companies to own and control trading intermediaries (Ministry of Foreign Trade, 1999) . 5 Our estimate implies that, even for a moderate level of under-reporting (understating the true value by one third), the revenue loss is close to one billion U.S. dollars, a sizable amount. This is also how much tax revenue the government can potentially obtain in the absence of such evasion. The evasion comes with a real cost over and beyond the tax revenue loss. For instance, the evasion has implications for the ability of the Chinese government to use variable VAT rebates as a policy instrument with various aims: promote high-technology sectors, reduce energy/pollution/resource-intensive products, promote phasing out of obsolete capital, reduce trade frictions, etc. It may be questioned a priori whether a single policy instrument can bear the weight of being addressed to so many objectives simultaneously. Our results imply that the effectiveness of variable VAT rebate rates as a policy instrument can be undermined by widespread evasion of the VAT on the part of exporting firms. The policy implications of this paper go beyond the specific context of tax evasion through trading firms in China. In general, this paper shows that rational firms, motivated by certain benefits, may change their export modes and organizational forms, which is otherwise unnecessary. Such kind of unproductive behaviors come with significant social costs to governments and market participants, especially in developing countries or countries in transition, like China.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review the literature in Section 2. In Section 3, we introduce the policy background of China's export tax rebate and the tax evasion mechanism. Section 4 discusses the empirical strategy and data. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Robustness checks are provided in Section 6. And Section 7 concludes.
Literature review
Our paper is related to the recent literature on tax evasion in international trade and trade intermediation. Tax evasion has been studied extensively in the public finance literature. 6 The review of the literature in the current paper focuses on tax evasion in international trade. One thread of the existing papers in this area follows the approach suggested by Fisman and Wei (2004) , identifying the evasion behaviors based on a correlation between tax or tariff rate and trade data reporting discrepancy (see also Javorcik and Narciso, 2008; Mishra, Subramanian, and Topalova, 2008; and Ferrantino, Liu, and Wang, 2008, among others) . Another thread of related papers studies the transfer pricing behaviors of multinational firms and how countries' tax rates affect firms' intra-firm trade prices and trade flows (see, e.g., Swenson, 2001; Clausing, 2003 and 2006; Bernard, Jensen, and Schott, 2006) .
The current paper, however, proposes a completely different approach to identify another evasion behavior, based on a correlation between unrefunded export VAT and tax benefit to indirect exports compared to direct exports. To the best knowledge of ours, the only existing paper investigating explicitly the role of trade intermediation in tax evasion is Fisman, Moustakerski and Wei (2008) , who find evidence that Hong Kong intermediaries that re-export Chinese products help to facilitate tariff evasion, and the incentive to evade tariffs increases with tariff rates. In their paper, the middlemen are trade intermediaries in Hong Kong, helping foreign exporters (either production or trading firms) to evade Chinese tariffs. Different from their paper, we study how trading companies may help domestic production firms to evade value added taxes through arm-length transactions or disguised intra-firm transfers. We add new evidence to the growing empirical literature on tax evasion in international trade. The practice of using middlemen for purposes of tax avoidance (legal) or tax evasion (illegal) and under-reporting trade values appears to exist throughout the world.
Thus, we believe that our findings are of more general relevance as well.
Much of the literature on trade intermediation focuses on the legitimate roles of intermediaries or middlemen in trade, such as guaranteeing product quality, matching sellers with buyers, liquidity provision, and contract enforcement. As Spulber (1996) puts it, "Intermediaries, by setting prices, purchasing and sales decisions, managing inventories, supplying information and coordinating transactions, provide the underlying microstructure of most markets." More recently, Feenstra and Hanson (2004) show that intermediary firms mitigate adverse selection by acting as guarantees of quality. Rauch and Watson (2004) model the emergence of trade intermediaries as an outcome of search frictions and network in international trade. Bernard et al. (2010) find a greater penetration of U.S. intermediate exports into smaller markets and a larger dominance of wholesalers in agriculture-related trade. Antras and Costinot (2011) study the welfare impact of trade liberalization in the form of a reduction in search frictions with the help of intermediaries. Felbermayr and Jung (2011) examine the effects of hold-up in trade intermediation in destination countries, emphasizing the relationship specificity of the products. In addition, several recent papers find a positive correlation between intermediated trade and various proxies for fixed trade costs (see, e.g., Bernard, Grazzi, and Tomasi, 2011; and Akerman, 2013) .
Unlike previous papers, we investigate the tax evasion incentive behind trade intermediation in China's exports. To our best knowledge, our paper is the first in the literature that investigates the dark side of firms' choice of their export modes. It is closely related to Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei (2011) and Tang and Zhang (2012) , both of which also study trade intermediation in China's exports, but have very different focuses from ours. Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei (2011) build a model in which firms with different productivity levels endogenously select to export directly, indirectly, or do not export at all. In their model, the most productive firms export directly; the firms with intermediate levels of productivity export indirectly; and the rest of firms do not export. They also provide empirical evidence that the intermediaries play a more important role in the markets that are more difficult to penetrate. Tang and Zhang (2012) study the roles of the intermediaries in quality differentiation and signaling. They test the story of quality verification by establishing a model with heterogeneity in productivity. They distinguish horizontal differentiation, which is the elasticity of substitution of consumers' preference, from vertical differentiation, which is the quality difference. Under the assumption that firms cannot write contracts ex ante to specify the division of surplus between producer and intermediary, the investment by intermediaries to investigate quality will be too low from the perspective of producers.
Because such under-investment is especially detrimental to high quality products, we should expect to see a negative correlation between indirect exporting and vertical differentiation.
For product more horizontally differentiated (less substitutable), quality concern is less important; so their model predicts a positive correlation between the prevalence of trade intermediation and cross product horizontal differentiation, which is consistent with Feenstra and Hanson (2004) .
Finally, our paper is also related to a growing literature on China's export VAT rebates.
Besides the several already mentioned papers on tax evasion, several other existing papers study the effect of China's export tax rebates on exports, e.g., Chao, Chou, and Yu (2001) , Yu (2006), Chien, Mai, and , and Chandra and Long (2013), Gourdon, Monjon, and Poncet (2014) . These papers find a positive relationship between rebate rates and exports, as what the policy was intended to do. Our paper is different from these papers as we study how VAT rebates affect the modes of exports (direct or indirect), instead of the level of exports.
Policy background and tax evasion mechanism

Export VAT rebate policies in China
Our findings exploit a feature of the Chinese VAT system. The VAT rebate rates for exports in China vary across products and over time, unlike the case of a pure destination-based VAT (e.g. that of the European Union). Since this feature of the system, giving rise to a de facto variable export tax, is central to our results, some background on the institutional framework is warranted.
Export tax rebates are a common practice in international trade. To avoid double taxation, tax authorities usually return to exporters the indirect taxes (e.g., VAT) firms have already paid in the production and distribution process. This practice is permitted under the GATT/WTO, as long as the tax rebate rates are no higher than the actual collection rates. For a long time, China has applied different taxes to domestic sales and foreign trade: domestic sales are subject to VAT; exports are VAT-free (i.e., no VAT on the value added at the final stage before exporting) and are usually eligible for rebates of previously paid input VAT; imports sometimes are exempt from duties. As documented by Cui (2003) Since 2002, the most common method of export tax rebate for direct exporters or production firms is called "Exemption, Credit, and Refund (ECR)". 10 "Exemption" means that export sales are exempt from output VAT. "Credit" means that input VAT on raw materials and supplies used for production can be credited against the output VAT on domestic sales. "Refund" means that the excess amount of input VAT over the output VAT will be rebated until a threshold, usually export value times rebate rate, is met. For intermediary trading firms, the method is called "Exemption and Refund": exemption means the same thing as in the case of ECR, and refund refers to the rebate of previously paid VAT on domestic purchases. Another difference between direct and indirect exports, which is critical to our analysis, is that the rebate to a direct exporter is based on its export FOB price, while the rebate to a trading firm is based on its domestic purchasing price.
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The rebate policies also differ across customs regimes. 12 China has two major types of customs regimes: normal trade and processing trade. Normal trade refers to imports intended for domestic markets and exports using mainly local inputs. Processing trade refers to the business activity of importing all or part of the inputs from abroad duty-free, and then exporting the finished products after processing or assembly. 
Tax evasion through indirect exports and main hypotheses
Because we do not observe the domestic purchasing price when a trading firm buys products from a producer in the customs data, we cannot test our hypothesis based on the price differential. Instead, we identify the evasion behaviors by examining the correlation between export tax rates and the probability of indirect exports. In the following, we explain the benefits and costs of this type of evasion and propose the testable hypotheses.
We assume that a production firm A can directly export a certain amount of goods at an FOB value of X; is the VAT rate; and is the VAT tax rebate rate. Under the ECR method, the total amount of tax burden firm A bears for this transaction is ( − ).
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Instead of exporting directly, production firm A may sell the same shipment to firm B, an intermediary trading firm, at the value of Y (VAT included). The amount of VAT firm B pays to A should be * /(1 + ), which is included in B's purchasing value of Y. We 13 The major difference between them is that local firms in processing with supplied materials are pure processors without obtaining the ownership of the supplied materials or final goods. In comparison, local firms in processing with imported materials obtain the ownership of the imported materials and are responsible for exporting the finished goods. 14 Another VAT method in China is "Refund After Collection": collect the VAT first on exports and refund later. This method, rarely used after 2002, is less relevant to our analysis which covers year 2005. 15 The exact formula for VAT liabilities is more complicated when a firm also sells in China, but here we consider only the part relevant to exports. See Ferrantino, Liu, and Wang (2008) , and Liu (2013) for additional discussion on China's export VAT rebate calculation.
denote the net of VAT domestic purchasing price as = /(1 + ). The trading firm B does not pay VAT when exporting, and can get a VAT rebate calculated as × . 16 Therefore, the total amount of export tax burden on this transaction is × ( − ).
To evade taxes, firms may under-report X or . In the case of indirect exporting of the products produced by firm A through a trading firm B, we also use X to denote the export value firm A would otherwise report under the hypothetical scenario of direct exporting, which can be different from trading firm B's export FOB price X ind , where the subscript ind denotes indirect exporting. A direct exporter (production firm) may under-report X for tax evasion purpose if it has a foreign partner to collude to recover later the losses due to export price under-reporting. 17 A trading firm, when under-reporting its domestic purchasing price, may also under-report export value X i to reduce the purchasing and selling price differential as discussed later.
Although both and X may be understated, we believe that is generally more likely to be under-reported than X for two reasons. First, it is arguably easier for firms to under-report domestically than under-reporting the export price X, for which firms need to find foreign partners to collude. Second, trading companies are usually larger and more familiar with foreign markets than production firms, so they are more likely to under-report export prices than direct exporters, which in turns helps to explain why trading firms are also more likely to under-report their domestic purchasing price without worrying too much about the purchasing and selling price differentials. In other words, firms are less likely to under-report export price X when exporting directly, but are more likely to under-report the domestic purchasing price (and export price X ind ) when exporting indirectly. Hence, in general is expected to be smaller than X, the export value a firm would report when exporting directly.
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Taking the export tax burden in both cases together, we can write the joint tax benefit to 16 The rebates for trading firms are based on their purchasing price Y or , rather than their exporting price. See Circular [1994] 17 As an illustrative example, the foreign partner (importer) may agree to remit a fraction of the true purchasing price directly to the exporter, causing an understatement for tax purposes, and place the rest in an offshore account for the benefit of the exporter. The balance in the offshore account can either be repatriated in a second, possibly concealed, transaction or used for such expenses as foreign education of the exporter's children. Another example is transfer pricing, a tax evasion scheme to shift income from high tax locations to low tax locations through manipulating trading prices within a multinational firm. 18 For a trading firm, its export selling price can be larger than its domestic purchasing price for legitimate (e.g., markup, and/or compensation for packaging and labeling services, and/or the provision of quality guarantee) or illegitimate reasons (e.g., tax evasion). The latter is what we consider in this paper.
firms A and B from indirect exporting as follows (compared to the hypothetical case of direct exporting by firm A).
If X is larger than for reasons discussed earlier, the benefit will be positive as long as t > r. When = , = 0. In other words, exporting through intermediary trading firm brings no benefit when export tax rate (t-r) is zero. This benefit is always non-negative because r is no higher than t. If we express = as a proportion of X, where 0 ≤ ≤ 1 measuring the ratio of the reported value to the true value (lower u means a larger degree of under-reporting), we can rewrite Equation (1) as follows:
Tax evasion not only can bring benefits to firms, but also can incur penalty when they get caught. The more taxes a firm evade, usually the heavier the penalty will be. The
Criminal Law of China 19 has a specific article on the crime of defrauding national export tax rebates and tax evasion (Article 204): "those evading a large amount of export VAT rebates through false-reporting exports or other fraudulent means will be subject to up to five years of imprisonment or criminal detention and a fine of one to five times of the defrauded tax amount; those defrauding a huge amount of tax or belonging to other serious circumstances will be subject to five to ten years of imprisonment and a fine of one to five times of the defrauded tax amount; those defrauding an especially huge amount of tax or belonging to other especially serious circumstances will be subject to at least ten years of term Here the average price, used as a reference price level, means the average of all the prices within a particular industry. The larger are these price differentials or the extent of under-reporting, the more likely a tax evading firm will be caught. The purchasing price is as in Equation (2), while the export price and average purchasing price can be reasonably considered a proxy for , the "true" value. 22 The above laws and rules suggest that the penalty is proportional to ( − ) or (1 − ) . Therefore, we can write the net benefit of tax evasion through intermediaries as follows:
where b is a penalty parameter, which can vary with firm or product characteristics. 23 A couple of notes on b are in order here. First, some of the supervision rules actually came into force after 2005, the year covered by our analysis. This is not necessarily a problem because b captures not just the above-mentioned government supervision. Even before this particular policy came into force, other factors could still influence the cost (e.g., the above-mentioned
Criminal Law) or at least the perceived cost of evasion. For example, if a firm consider it unsafe to under-report the price of homogenous goods such as wheat or rice, it will be less likely to do so even without an explicit supervision policy in place. Second, there are certainly other benefits or costs firms would consider when they decide to export directly or indirectly. For example, one important factor behind exporting directly is to save the fixed cost of direct exporting. Here, we choose to simplify away all of the other benefits or costs resulting from choosing direct or indirect export modes. This simplification is not a problem because the other benefits or costs are unlikely related to export tax.
If we ignore all of other benefits or costs related to indirect exports, the probability of a firm choosing to export indirectly can be written as follows:
In our empirical analysis, the probability of indirect export is captured by a continuous measure of the share of indirect exports in total exports for each product. For a given b, the larger ( − ) is, the stronger is the motive of exporting through trading firm. Hence, we have 22 The comparison between a firm's price with the average industrial level price is a useful indicator. Alternatively, the differential between a trading firm's own purchasing and selling prices may also be used, but it can be rendered ineffective if the firm under-reports both of its purchasing and selling (export) prices. 23 b measures the expected level of punishment, determined by the probability of a firm being caught and the level of punishment once it gets caught. Because we cannot distinguish the two from each other in our empirical analysis, we simply take b as the expected level of punishment. For a rational exporter, b should be between 0 and 1.
the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 1
The probability of exporting indirectly should be higher in industries facing larger unrebated export VAT rates (i.e., t-r).
Equation (3) also suggests that a production firm is more likely to choose to export indirectly when b (the degree of penalty) is lower. For example, the probability of evasion through indirect exporting would be higher when they are unlikely to be caught or unlikely to be heavily penalized (b is small). In addition, a marginal increase in (t-r) will be more likely to make a difference in determining firms' choice of export modes when b is low. On the contrary, when b is high, the condition in Equation (4) will be less likely to hold and a small increase in (t-r) may not change firms' choices of export modes. Hence we have another hypothesis as follows:
HYPOTHESIS 2 The tax evasion motive through indirect exports should be higher when the firms are less likely to be penalized for such behaviors, ceteris paribus.
We previously mention that the benefit in Equations (1) and (2) should be non-negative.
The same is true for the net benefit in Equation (3). If ( − ) > b, then the net benefit is positive and a production firm will choose to export indirectly to evade taxes. If ( − ) ≤ , then the net benefit will be censored at zero (not negative) because the production firm will not export indirectly for tax evasion purpose. Therefore, we can just consider the case when ( − ) > , and the production firm exports indirectly for tax evasion purpose. When the benefit is bounded below by zero, a larger transaction value (X) can only increase the benefit from the evasion through intermediaries. Moreover, if we also consider the fixed cost of evasion, a production firm will export indirectly only if the net tax benefit (∆) as in Equation (3) exceeds the fixed cost, ceteris paribus. Because the net benefit increases with X, we have the following hypothesis, which can be tested using transaction level data rather than HS8 product level data.
HYPOTHESIS 3
The tax evasion motive through indirect exports should be higher for larger transactions (larger X).
Empirical strategy and data
Empirical strategy
We aim to examine empirically how export VAT taxes affect indirect exports. Because China applies the same VAT rebate rate on a product exported to all of the destination countries, we are able to test the tax evasion hypothesis using data at product level without importing countries' information. Our benchmark regressions will be carried out at the HS 8-digit product level (HS8) at test the first two hypotheses, using the following specification:
where the subscript i denotes the Harmonized System (HS, version 2002) 8-digit product 24 ; Z is a vector of control variables including trade regime and firm ownership type variables, measures of product differentiation, etc.; γ is the coefficient vector for Z; and e i is the error term.
To test the second hypothesis, we examine how the tax evasion motive varies with product and firm characteristics. Similar to Javorcik and Narciso (2008) and Mishra, Subramanian, and Topalova (2008) , we argue that evasion through price under-reporting might be easier for differentiated products than homogenous products whose prices are often standard. Rauch (1999) defines homogeneous goods as products whose price is set on organized exchanges, defines reference priced goods as those not traded on organized exchanges but possessing a benchmark price, and defines the goods whose price is not set on organized exchanges and which lack a reference price because of their intrinsic features as differentiated products. We would expect to find stronger support for the evasion hypothesis from differentiated products, while weaker evidence from referenced and especially homogenous products. We will run regressions for different subsamples grouped based on the level of product differentiation or include interaction terms between export tax rate and the trade regime and firm ownership type variables. 
Customs trade data
The shipment level trade data of China are released by the China Customs Office. It is organized monthly based on the shipment documents that firms submit to the corresponding customs offices. In our paper, we use only the information of destination/source country, HS In the data, China Customs does not directly distinguish the production firms from the intermediary trading firms, but firms' Chinese names include the words like "Jinchukou", "Jingmao", "Maoyi", "Waimao", "Kemao", "Waijing", and "Gong Mao". Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei (2011) classify all of them except "Gongmao" as trading firms, while Tang and Zhang (2012) include also "Gongmao". 27 Following them, we also use these keywords to identify trading firms and create two measures: a conservative measure as in Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei (2011) ; and a liberal measure as in Tang and Zhang (2012) . In 2005, the share of indirect exports among total exports in China is about 20% based on the conservative definition of indirect exports (21%, based on the liberal definition). Because the average size of shipments tends to be smaller for indirect exports than that for direct exports, the 25 The different findings from homogenous and differentiated products can also help to invalidate alternative interpretations other than tax evasion. For instance, in a standard Melitz-type model, higher export tax rates would reduce profits from direct exporting, making indirect exporting relatively more profitable. In terms of Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei (2011) , this means that the cutoff productivity level for direct exporting increases, and thus indirect export share also increases. Although our empirical findings of a positive correlation between unrebated VAT rates and indirect exports share are also consistent with the productivity sorting mechanism, this mechanism cannot explain the stronger support from differentiated products. for the tax net of rebate (t-r) are 0% (7.5%), 4% (70.5), 8% (11.1%), and 17% (3.4%). In line with the WTO rules, the VAT rebate rates are always no higher than the collection rates.
The data used in our country-product level and transaction level analysis will be described in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 respectively. Other variables used in the robustness checks will be discussed in Section 6. Appendix 2 lists some descriptive statistics of the variables used in the paper. It is tempting to calculate ownership shares based only on direct exports. Implicitly, this method assumes that the ownership structure of the products exported indirectly is the same as that of directly exported products. If this assumption is correct, then the ownership shares should not affect the indirect export shares and hence should not be included in the regressions in the first place. If the production structures are different for directly and indirectly exported products, then using the ownership based only on direct exporters will also be problematic. This is why we continue to calculate ownership shares based on total exports. Dropping these ownership variables from our regressions does not affect our main findings at all.
Empirical results
A product level analysis
include HS8 product fixed effects. Nevertheless, we always include HS 4-digit level fixed effects to control for any unobserved heterogeneity at HS4 level (about 1300 products). 31 In most tables (except Table 4 on transaction level analysis), the dependent variable is the share of indirect exports, ranging from 0 to 100; (t-r) is also measured in percentage point, ranging from 0 to 17. But the export shares by trade regime and firm ownership type are measured in percent, between 0 and 1. The omitted trade regime is normal trade. The omitted firm type is SOE.
The first regression uses the full sample, while the next three regressions use the subsamples of homogenous, referenced, and differentiated products respectively according to the Rauch's product classification. 32 In the last column, we combine homogenous with referenced products, and call them together non-differentiated products. The estimated coefficient of (t-r) is positive and significant at the 5% level in the regressions using the full sample, supporting our Hypothesis 1. For regressions based on subsamples, the coefficient of (t-r) is positive and significant only for differentiated products, but insignificant for homogenous and referenced products. In addition, the estimated coefficient is much larger for differentiated products in absolute value (-1.481). The result that (t-r) is positive and significant only for differentiated products but not for other products supports our second hypothesis. Finally, in the last column, we combine homogenous with referenced products to increase the number of observations and find that the coefficient of (t-r) is still highly insignificant, suggesting that the insignificant result in Columns (2) and (3) are not simply driven by smaller observations.
Our estimates also imply that the impact of avoidance behavior is economically significant. The estimate reported in Column (4) implies that a one standard deviation increase in (t-r), which is 3.1 as shown in Appendix 2 (Panel I), would lead to about a 7.76
percentage increase in the indirect export share of differentiated products; when a differentiated product changes from zero export tax to a full 17% tax, its indirect export share would increase by 25.5%. Even if we use the point estimate in Column (1) of Table 1 for the full sample, one standard deviation change in (t-r) can increase indirect export share by 4.6 percentage point. The magnitude is comparable to those estimated for factors in other papers.
For example, Tang and Zhang (2012) show that one standard deviation change in various 31 We do not use HS6 fixed effects because only about 8% of the HS6 products lines have more than two HS8 lines. Including HS6 fixed effects would be too demanding because they would absorb most of the variations in (t-r). 32 We concord the original liberal measure of Rauch's classification at 4-digit SITC level to HS 6-digit level, and then to HS 8-digit level. We can also show the potential tax revenue loss from evasion through trade intermediation, as a back-of-envelope calculation. Using Equation (3) and assuming away the penalty of evasion (b) for now, the tax benefit to firms or revenue loss to government is
(1-u)*(t-r)*X, where X refers to the expected value of indirect export value for tax evasion purpose. To estimate X, we first calculate the probability of indirect export for tax evasion purpose as the product of the coefficient estimate for differentiated products (i.e., 1.5
percentage points increase for a percentage increase in export tax) and export tax rate, and then multiply this probability by the total export value (direct plus indirect export) for each differentiated product. Using Equation (3) and assuming u = 0, the estimated revenue loss for all of the differentiated products can be as large as 2.73 billion U.S. dollars in 2005. Even for a moderate level of under-reporting (let's say u = 2/3, implying that the true transaction value is under-reported by 1/3), the revenue loss is close to one billion U.S. dollars, a sizable amount. This is also how much tax revenue the government can potentially obtain in the absence of such an evasion.
The results in Table 1 also suggest that processing firms, already teamed up with foreign partners, are significantly less likely to export indirectly compared to normal firms (the default category). Collective, private, and especially foreign firms are less likely to export indirectly as compared to state-owned firms (the omitted category). These results can also reflect partly the entry rules of the intermediary firms imposed by the government. It was much more difficult to establish a foreign or private trading firm than a SOE trading company for a long time. Even after the relaxation of the entry policy in 2004, the SOE share of intermediary trading firms remained much higher than that of the production firms for a while.
In addition, foreign firms usually export directly because the fixed cost of direct exporting is low due to their close connections to foreign markets and they may be more capable of evading taxes through other means such as transfer pricing through intra-firm transactions.
Considering that exporters belonging to different trade regimes and ownership types may have different levels of evasion incentive, we include in the regressions on Table 2 the interaction terms between (t-r) and the shares by trade regimes and firm ownership types. The regressions in Table 2 are analogous to those in Table 1 , except that we include these interaction terms. These interaction terms are mostly negative but almost always insignificant at the 10% level. Although the results suggest that processing firms and non-SOE firms seem to be less likely to evade taxes through intermediaries than normal and SOE firms (the default category), the evidence is weak. Because these interaction terms are mostly insignificant, we do not include them in our baseline regressions.
A product-country level analysis: domestic evasion and cross-border evasion
In this subsection, we instead examine whether domestic evasion and cross-border evasion are linked to each other. As discussed above, one of the criteria Chinese tax authorities adopt to detect evasion behaviors is based on purchasing and selling price differential (PSD). As a result, trading companies that have purchased products from production firms at an under-reported price (i.e., domestic evasion) will also have an incentive to under-report export prices (i.e., cross-border evasion), to avoid large PSD and minimize the chance of being caught. To test this hypothesis, we carry out a product-country level analysis.
Many characteristics of the importing countries of Chinese products, such as geographic distance and destination market size can also affect firms' choice of export modes. For example, geographic distance adds to the transportation costs of exporting, so firms tend to avoid exporting directly to countries far away; the probability of indirect exporting to a large foreign market is low because it is worthwhile to invest in the fixed costs of direct exporting when a destination market is large enough. Although these factors are interesting, they are not the focus of this paper and have already been studied by existing papers (e.g., Bernard et al., 2010; Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei, 2011) . Since country fixed effects will be used in our product-country level analysis, all of these country characteristics are absorbed by the fixed effects.
In Table 3 , we report the results from regressions at the HS8 product-country level. The dependent variable is the indirect export share calculated at the product-country level. The key explanatory variable is (t-r), which still varies only across products as before because the same rate applies to a product exported to all destination markets. The control variables include the export shares by trade regimes and firm ownership types, calculated at the product-country level. The first regression is based on the subsample with positive GAP, while the second columns are for the subsample with negative or zero GAP. HS4 product and country fixed effects are always included. As expected, (t-r) has a positive and significant effect on indirect export share only for products with positive GAP that indicates a higher chance of export under-reporting at Chinese border. This implies that the under-reporting behaviors through domestic intermediaries may be associated with cross-border evasion through under-reporting export values. The magnitude of the coefficient of (t-r) for the positive GAP subsample is very similar to that reported in Column (1) of Table 1 for the whole sample (0.667 vs. 0.673). The coefficients of other variables also have expected signs:
non-SOEs (especially foreign firms) and processing firms are less likely to use intermediaries than SOEs and normal firms.
A transaction level analysis
Our third hypothesis states that the evasion motive is stronger for larger transactions. To test it, we need to carry out a transaction level analysis. In Table 4 , we report the results from regressions at the transaction level. Here the dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the final exporter in a transaction is a production firm (0) or trading firm (1), based on the conservative classification. (t-r) is still measured at HS8 product level. 33 log(value) is the logarithm of the value of an export transaction, where value is measured in current 33 Because the dependent variable is a dummy, which is on average much smaller than the indirect export share in percentage (ranging from 1 to 100), the coefficients can be much smaller than what we got from the product-level analysis. To avoid very small estimated coefficients of (t-r) and its interaction with log(value), we divide (t-r) by 100, so that it is now measured in percent, not in percentage as in our product-level analysis. million U.S. dollars. Since a firm may exports multiple products at the tariff line level and each product may be exported through multiple transactions in a year, the number of observations at transaction level is extremely large, up to nearly 14 million in the regression.
To avoid intensive computation, we adopt a linear probability model (LPM) rather than a logit or probit model. To prevent the variable (t-r) from being dropped, we include HS 4-digit fixed effects rather than HS 8-digit fixed effects. We also include country fixed effects to control for the unobserved heterogeneity at country level. In regression (1), we include only (t-r), log(value) and their interaction term as the explanatory variables. The coefficient of (t-r)
is still positive as expected and is highly significant. The negative coefficient of log (value) suggests that firms involving in larger transactions are less likely to use intermediaries on average probably because the fixed costs of direct exporting becomes less important for large transactions. More importantly, the positive coefficient of (t-r)*log(value) implies that firms involved in larger transactions are more likely to evade taxes through indirect exports, all else equal. This lends strong support to Hypothesis 3.
In regression (2) 
Robustness checks and other issues
In this section, we perform a number of robustness checks and discuss several additional issues.
First, we always use the conservative measure of indirect export share in our previous analysis. In Table 5 (1), we check the robustness of our results to the alternative liberal measure. The first three regressions are based on the full sample, and subsamples for differentiated and non-differentiated (i.e., homogenous and referenced) products, respectively, without including any interaction terms. The next three regressions are analogous to the first three ones, with additional interaction terms between (t-r) and processing trade share and the shares by ownership types. The results are very similar to the corresponding regressions using the same specifications reported earlier, except that the interactions between (t-r) with firm ownership shares (especially with the foreign share) are more significant. We find stronger evidence for the evasion by SOEs probably because SOEs are more familiar with the domestic policies and are better connected to government officials, and hence can do better than foreign firms to take advantage of the policy loopholes in China. The results from the previous country-product level and transaction level analyses are also robust to the alternative liberal definition of trading firms, but are not shown in tables to save space. This is to be expected given the small difference between the conservative and liberal definitions of trading firms as reported in Section 4.2.
Second, we consider some additional variables that may also explain the variations in indirect export share. As discussed in the literature, trading firms can play a role in verifying product quality for buyers. Therefore, different product quality heterogeneity across industries can affect the choice of exporting modes. Following Tang and Zhang (2012), we examine both the horizontal differentiation and vertical differentiation, together with the tax evasion motivation. For the horizontal differentiation, we use the elasticity of substitution estimated by Broda and Weinstein (2006) . For vertical differentiation, we use R&D and advertising intensity of each industry constructed from the NBS industrial census data as in Tang and Zhang (2012) . 34 In Table 5 (2), we add the two variables to regressions based on the full sample, and subsamples for differentiated and non-differentiated products respectively. Although the number of observations is greatly reduced owing to missing data in the two additional variables, our main finding remains robust: (t-r) is positive and significant not only for differentiated products but also in the full sample, but not significant for non-differentiated products. The coefficient of the measure of elasticity of substitution (sigma) is never statistically significant at the 10% level. Advertising and R&D intensity, when significant at the 10% level, has a negative effect on indirect export share. This is consistent with the argument in Tang and Zhang (2012) . We do not include these variables in our baseline regressions to avoid dropping a large number of observations due to missing data.
Third, we examine some alternative stories which can also be consistent with our results.
China has used the rebate rates frequently as an industrial policy to promote the exports of high-tech and deep processed products and discourage the exports of pollution and resource intensive products and primary products. To curb the exports of resource-intensive products such as rare earths, for example, China reduced their rebate rates in 2004, leading to higher unrefunded export VAT rates (t-r) for these products. Because these resource-based products are also more likely to be state-owned than other products and SOEs are more likely to export indirectly as shown previously, this may also lead to a positive correlation between indirect export share and (t-r). Based on the classification for primary products and resource-based products as in Lall (2000), we find that the average unrefund rates for primary products and resource-based products in our sample are indeed higher than that of other products (7.06%
and 5.84% vs. 4%), and the average indirect export shares of primary and resource-based products are also higher than that of other products (35% and 33% vs. 31%).
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On the contrary, high-tech products have been encouraged by Chinese government and received relatively higher rebate rates (in other words, lower (t-r)). If high-tech products which are usually associated with higher quality are less likely to be exported indirectly according to Tang and Zhang (2012) , this can also lead to a positive correlation between (t-r) and the share of indirect exports. Based on China's official classification of advanced technology products as published on the 2005 China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology 36 , we find that the average unrefund rate for advanced-technology products in our sample is higher than that of other products (5.84% vs. 4.45%), but the average indirect export share advanced-technology products is only slightly higher than that of other products (32.5% vs. 31.6%).
Although including HS4 product fixed effects can help to alleviate the above concerns, we also take them as problems of omitted variable bias by checking the robustness of our previous main finding after including the dummies for primary products (Primary), resource-based products (Resource), and advanced-technology products (Advanced-tech).
The results are reported in the first three regressions of Table 5 (3), where with the three 35 These data are based on the sample used in the first regression in Table 1 . The three groups of products (Primary Products, Resource-based Products, and others) are mutually exclusive, accounting for 840, 1317 and 4,852 observations respectively. 36 The original primary product and resource-based product data in Lall (2000) are in SITC 3-digit level. We concord them to HS 6-digit. The original ATP data are at 4-digit Chinese Industrial Classification (CIC). We first concord CIC to 4-digit ISIC, and then to HS 6-digit. Although we have access to other classifications of high-tech products such as those in Lall (2000) and Ferrantino et al. (2007) , we choose to use China's own official definition because that is what the rebate rates are actually based on.
additional dummies in addition to the product differentiation measures (Ad-R&D-Sales and sigma). Similar to what we found earlier, the key covariate (t-r) remains positive and significant in the regressions based on the full sample and the subsample for differentiated goods, but insignificant for non-differentiated goods, with little change in the magnitude of the estimated coefficients compared to the previous result table. The coefficients of these newly added dummies suggest that primary and high-tech products are more likely to be exported through trading firms, but they are not always significant and sometimes bear mixed signs for the two subsamples. We conclude that omitting them from our baseline regressions does not significantly bias our estimated coefficients.
For similar reasons as stated above, some products are subject to zero or full rebates when the government intended to promote or discourage the exports in certain sectors. To make sure that our results are not driven by various other unobserved policies besides the VAT rebates, we also add to our regressions in the last three columns of Table 5 (3) a dummy indicating if a product is subject to zero or full rebate rate. This variable, however, turns out to be insignificant. Although this variable is likely correlated with rebate rates, it may not vary with indirect export share in a significant way. The estimated coefficients of other variables change little, suggesting that our results are not driven by these factors.
In addition, besides the use of export rebate rate as an industrial policy, other factors may also affect the rebate rates. For example, as described in Section 3.1, China started with a full rebate system but changed it to a partial rebate system due to budget constraint.
Ignoring the budget issue is not a problem for us unless it is also correlated with indirect export share. Although budget shortfall might motivate the government to tackle tax evasion problems, there is no evidence showing that the evasion through indirect exports in particular has already been in the radar of the government when it adjusts rebate rates. Moreover, rebate rates may also be adjusted in response to the level or the growth rate of exports in an industry.
However, this is not a problem either as long as the level or the growth rate of exports is not correlated with indirect export share. All of these concerns, together with those considered in Table 5 (3), are related to the endogeneity of VAT rebate rates. In our opinion, however, the endogeneity issues do not seem to be a major concern.
Fourth, we have so far split the full sample into differentiated and non-differentiated products. Alternatively, we can also create a dummy variable indicating if a product belongs to differentiated product and then interact it with export tax rate. The benefit of doing this is that we can retain all the products in the regressions to increase the sample size. The result is reported in the first column of Moreover, alternative to Rauch's nomenclature, we could also use an interaction term between export tax and some proxies defined using continuous indicators to account for product differentiation. The results in Tables 5(2) and 5(3) show that products with high advertising and R&D intensity (Ad-R&D-Sales) is significantly associated with lower trade intermediation. In the second column of Table 5 (4), we include the interaction between Ad-R&D-Sales and export tax rate as an additional regressor. As expected, the interaction term is estimated to have a significant and positive effect on indirect export share. This is consistent with our previous finding based on Racuh's classification, even though the correlation between "Diff" dummy defined according to Rauch (1999) and Ad-R&D-Sales is quite weak with a simple correlation coefficient at 0.2. The result suggests that our results are robust to alternative measures of product differentiation.
Fifth, as mentioned earlier, export VAT rebate does not apply to processing trade with supplied materials, and this is why we exclude this type of trade from our previous analysis.
37
To assure that our result is indeed driven by tax evasion rather than some other mechanisms, we run similar regressions using only exports under processing trade with supplied materials as a falsification exercise. The results are reported in Table 5 (5). As only one type of trade regime is kept, the export share variables by trade regime are dropped from the regressions.
The export tax variable is significant for neither non-differentiated products nor differentiated products, as we expect. This is consistent with the fact that processing trade with supplied materials is not qualified for export VAT rebates and provides further assurance for our tax evasion story.
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Finally, as discussed earlier, it should be easier for a production firm to find a domestic trading firm to evade taxes through under-reporting domestic selling prices than to find a foreign partner to collude through under-reporting export prices. If this is true, then indirect exports will be more likely to be under-reported than direct exports when (t-r) is high. As a result, the indirect export share (our dependent variable) will be lower than its true value when (t-r) is high. It can only lead to a negative correlation between indirect export share and (t-r). Given that we have already found a positive and significant correlation between them, the true coefficient should be even more positive and significant.
Concluding remarks
We have identified a significant role for domestic middlemen in facilitating tax evasion in Chinese export trade. This supplements the classic roles of middlemen in helping to overcome imperfect information about markets, connecting buyers and sellers, and certifying product quality, etc. We have identified systematic differences in the effectiveness of this evasion strategy for different types of trade, and traders. The use of middlemen is more likely to be associated with tax evasion for differentiated products, which are more difficult for the authorities to assign benchmark prices to for enforcement purposes. This is consistent with other research on tax and tariff evasion in trade, such as the literature on transfer pricing. The association of middlemen with tax evasion is also stronger for state-owned enterprises than for either foreign enterprises or other Chinese domestic enterprises, suggesting that SOEs may have an institutional or political-economy advantage when it comes to tax evasion.
Although the revenue loss and other social costs are economically large, Chinese government did not seem to have noticed such VAT evasion through indirect exports, based on the officially listed evasion behaviors that are subjected to punishment (see Law
Interpretation [2002] 39 ). Our paper, by identifying such a kind of evasion, can help the government to tackle the problem. Although the partial rebate policy in China has been quite effective as an industrial policy, it also leads to some unintended consequences, such as tax evasion and trade data mis-reporting as studied in the current paper and round-trip trade as studied by Liu (2013) . China may eventually need to streamline the rebate policy and follow the international practice of full rebate. In addition, China should also strengthen the enforcement of anti-evasion policies to detect collusion among related firms and deter these is the share of indirect exports (conservative measure), ranging from 0 to 100. The export shares by trade regime and firm ownership type variables range from 0 to 1. The omitted trade regime is normal trade. The omitted firm ownership type is SOE. The last column is for non-differentiated products, including both homogenous and referenced products. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. is the share of indirect exports at product-country level (conservative measure), ranging from 0 to 100. The export shares by trade regime and firm ownership type variables range from 0 to 1. GAP is the trade data reporting discrepancy, defined as log(importing country reported imports from China)-log(China reported exports). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. A linear probability model is adopted. Dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the final exporter is a producing firm (0) or trading firm (1), using the conservative classification. (t-r) refers to the unrefunded export VAT rate in percent, ranging from 0 to 0.17 (not in percentage as in other tables, adjusted to avoid very small coefficient estimates). log(value) is the logarithm of the transaction value in million current dollars. prc equals one if the exporting firm involved in the transaction belongs to processing trade, and zero otherwise. oth_regime equals one if the exporter involved in the transaction belongs to any of the trade regimes other than normal trade and processing trade, and zero otherwise. collpriv equals one if the exporter involved in the transaction is either a collective or a private firm, and zero otherwise. for equals one if the exporter involved in the transaction is a foreign wholly owned company, or an equity joint venture, or a contractual joint venture, and zero otherwise. oth_owner equals one if the exporter involved in the transaction belongs to any of the ownership types other than SOEs, collective & private, and foreign firms, and zero otherwise. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The regressions are at HS8 level. The dependent variable is the share of indirect exports (conservative measure), ranging from 0 to 100. The export shares by trade regime and firm ownership type variables range from 0 to 1. The omitted trade regime is normal trade. The omitted firm type is SOE. Ad-R&D-Sales refers to the advertising and R&D intensity. Sigma refers to elasticity of substitution. "Diff" refers to differentiated products according to Rauch's classification. "Non-diff" products include both homogenous and referenced products. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The regressions are at HS8 level. The dependent variable is the share of indirect exports (conservative measure), ranging from 0 to 100. The export shares by trade regime and firm ownership type variables range from 0 to 1. The omitted trade regime is normal trade. The omitted firm type is SOE. Ad-R&D-Sales refers to the advertising and R&D intensity. Sigma refers to elasticity of substitution. Primary refers to the primary product dummy. Resource refers to the resource based product dummy. Advanced-tech refers to the advanced technology products dummy. Zero/full rebate dummy controls for the products with either a zero or a full rebate rate. "Diff" refers to differentiated products according to Rauch's classification. "Non-diff" products include both homogenous and referenced products. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The regressions are at HS8 level. The dependent variable is the share of indirect exports (conservative measure), ranging from 0 to 100. The export shares by trade regime and firm ownership type variables range from 0 to 1. The omitted trade regime is normal trade. The omitted firm ownership type is SOE. "diff" is a dummy variable which equals one if a product belongs to differentiated product and zero for both homogenous and referenced products. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (prcs) . The dependent variable is the share of indirect exports (conservative measure), ranging from 0 to 100. The export shares of prcs by trade regime and firm ownership type variables range from 0 to 1. The omitted trade regime is normal trade. The omitted firm ownership type is SOE. "Diff" refers to differentiated products according to Rauch's classification. "Non-diff" products include both homogenous and referenced products. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. measure. (t-r) refers to the unrefunded export VAT rate in percentage. prc_sh is the export value share of processing trade with imported materials (in percent). collpriv_sh is the export value share of private and collective firms. for_sh is the export value share of foreign wholly owned companies, equity joint venture, and contractual joint ventures (in percent).
Panel II: Product-country level data, based on the sample in column (1) of (t-r) refers to the unrefunded export VAT rate in percent, ranging from 0 to 0.17 (not in percentage, adjusted to avoid very small coefficient estimates). log(value) is the logarithm of the transaction value in million current dollars. prc equals one if the exporting firm involved in the transaction belongs to processing trade, and zero otherwise. oth_regime equals one if the exporter involved in the transaction belongs to any of the trade regimes other than normal trade and processing trade, and zero otherwise. collpriv equals one if the exporter involved in the transaction is either a collective or a private firm, and zero otherwise. for equals one if the exporter involved in the transaction is a foreign wholly owned company, or an equity joint venture, or a contractual joint venture, and zero otherwise. oth_owner equals one if the exporter involved in the transaction belongs to any of the ownership types other than SOEs, collective & private, and foreign firms, and zero otherwise.
